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Introduction

1.1

Facts

The shape of the American household has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. Some
salient features of this transformation are:
1. The Decline in Marriage. The fraction of the population that has ever been married
has fallen dramatically since 1960. At that time, about 86 percent of college educated
individuals and 92 percent of non-college educated ones between the ages of 25 and 54
were married (or had been married)–see Figure 1. (Data sources for this and all other
…gures are provided in the Appendix.) Today, only 79 percent are.1 Note that the fall
in the fraction of the population that is married is greatest for non-college educated
people. Part of the decline in marriage is due to a delay in the age of marriage. Part
is due to a rise in divorce. In 1960 the fraction of the population that was divorced,
as measured by the ratio of the currently divorced to the ever-married population,
was 3 percent for the non-college educated populace and 2 percent for the college
educated segment. Today, it is close to 17 percent for the former and 11 percent for
the latter. Again, observe that divorce has risen more for the non-college educated
vis-à-vis the college educated. The fact that the decline in marriage and the rise in
divorce has a¤ected college educated and non-college educated people di¤erentially
has been noted both by sociologists, Martin (2006), and economists, Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007).
2. The Rise in Assortative Mating. When individuals marry today, as opposed to yesterday, they are more likely to pair with an individual from the same socioeconomic class.
To see this split the world into two socioeconomic classes, viz non-college educated and
college educated, and compare the two contingency tables contained in Table 1.
1

Redoing Figure 1 with currently-married individuals, as opposed to ever-married ones, delivers a qualitatively similar pattern.
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Figure 1: Marriage and Divorce by Education

Table 1: Assortative Mating, age 25-54
1960
2005
Wife
Husband
Wife
Husband
< College
College
< College
College
< College
0.856 (0.823) 0.024 (0.056)
< College
0.565 (0.450) 0.109 (0.223)
College
0.080 (0.113) 0.040 (0.008)
College
0.103 (0.218) 0.0.223 (0.108)
2
2
= 40; 567
= 0:41
n = 241; 488
= 93; 446
= 0:52
n = 347; 210

The number in a cell shows the fraction of all matches that occur in the speci…ed
category. The …gure in parenthesis provides the fraction that would occur if matching
occurred randomly. First, note that there is positive assortative mating. The hypothesis of random matching is rejected by the
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statistics. Second, the extent of positive

assortative mating has become stronger over time. This is shown by the Pearson correlation coe¢ cient, , which measures the degree of association between the female and
male educational categories.
To further illustrate the rise in assortative mating, consider running a regression for
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married couples of the form
educationw
t =

+

X

t

educationht

j2J

+

X

dummyj;t
dummyj;t + "t ; with "t

t

N (0;

t );

j2J

(1)
where: educationw
t 2 f0; 1g is the observed level of the wife’s education in period t and takes value of one if the woman completed college and a value of zero
otherwise; educationht 2 f0; 1g is the husband’s education; dummyj;t is a dummy
variable for time such that dummyj;t = 1 if j = t and dummyj;t = 0 if j 6= t;
t = 1960; 1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; and 2005 gives the years in the sample and J is the
subset of these years that omits 1960. The coe¢ cient

t

measures the additional im-

pact relative to 1960 that a husband’s education will have on his wife’s. Note that the
impact of a secular rise in female educational attainment is controlled by the presence
of the time dummy variable. So, how does
rise in the

t ’s.

The

t

t

change over time? Figure 2 plots the

coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from one another at the

99 percent con…dence level. The same …nding obtains if instead logits or probits are
run. The rise in assortative mating has been noted before by sociologists Schwartz and
Mare (2005).
3. The Increase in Education and Labor-Force Participation by Females. Labor-force
participation by married females has increased dramatically over the last 50 years.
This is true for both college educated and non-college educated women. In 1960 a
minority of both classes of women worked. Now, the majority do–see Figure 3. At the
same time, the number of women choosing to educate themselves has risen sharply.
This may have been stimulated by a rise in the college premium, shown in Figure 4.
College-educated women have always worked more than non-college educated ones. As
female labor-force participation rose so did a married woman’s contribution to family
income–again, see Figure 3. Figure 4 also shows how the gender gap has narrowed.
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Figure 2: Rise in Assortative Mating. The solid line plots the regression coe¢ cient,
dashed lines show the 95 percent intervals.
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Figure 3: The Increase in Female Labor-Force Participation. The inset panel shows the
contribution of married females to family income.
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Figure 4: The Rise in Female Educational Attainment, the College Premium and the Narrowing of the Gender Gap

1.2

The Hypothesis

What are the economic forces behind this dramatic shift in household characteristics? The
idea is described below in a nutshell. People marry for both economic and noneconomic
reasons: material well-being and love. On the material side of things, a woman’s labor
is important for both home production and market production. Over time the value of a
woman’s labor in household production has declined, due to technological progress in the
household sector. Speci…cally, inputs into home production, such as dishwashers, frozen
foods, microwave ovens, washing machines, and most recently the internet, have reduced the
need for household labor. Therefore, love and the value of a woman’s labor on the market
have come to play more important roles, relative to the value of a woman’s labor in home
production, in the decision about whether or not to get married and whom to marry.
The hypothesis here is that technological progress at home and in the market drove this
transformation in households. What are the channels through which technological progress
operates? They are delineated as follows:
1. Economies of scale in household maintenance.
2. Substitutability of labor and intermediate goods in household production.
5

3. Higher diminishing marginal utility for household goods vis-à-vis market ones.
4. Rising living standards.
5. Skilled-biased technological progress in the market.
6. A declining gender gap in wages.
An economic motive for marriage is provided for by Point 1. For example, suppose there
is a …xed cost in terms of market goods of maintaining a household. Then, two-person
households will be better o¤ than single-person ones. As incomes grow in line with Point 4
such …xed costs will be easier to cover. Therefore, a trend to smaller households will emerge.
This will be re‡ected in a lower marriage rate and a higher divorce rate. One would expect
that this consideration will bite harder for poorer people than for richer ones. Hence, at
low stages of development the theory suggests that non-college educated people will be more
likely to marry. They will also experience a larger drop in their marriage rate and bigger
rise in their divorce rate as incomes grow.
Point 2 implies that labor will be released from married households if the price of intermediate goods drops due to technological advance in the home sector. This promotes a rise
in married female labor-force participation. (Assume that both single females and males
work full time.) Now, single households will bene…t the most from technological advance
in the home sector, if Point 3 holds. This is because at the margin they will be the most
intensive users of home production, as paradoxical as this may seem. That is, while the
economically better o¤ married couple (due to economies of scale) will consume more of all
goods, relative to a single person, they will not consume twice as much home goods, because
they will prefer to direct, at the margin, their larger consumption bundle toward market
ones. Technological progress in the home allows for more home goods to be produced. It
will improve single life the most because the marginal value for a home produced good is
highest for singles. This operates to reduce household size.
Skilled-biased technological progress results in skilled labor becoming more valuable relative to unskilled labor. This leads to an upward movement in the college premium. As
a consequence, more males will complete college. More females should …nish college too.
6

Take a single female …rst. The income earned when single will now have risen for a college
educated woman, relative to a non-college educated one. Thus, a college educated single
female can now live better than before (again, relative to an non-college educated one). The
extra income that a college education now provides means that a college educated single
woman can a¤ord to be choosier when selecting a husband. The same reasoning applies
to being single because of a divorce. Now, consider a married female. If she works, the
return to a college education will have risen because her family will have more income. This
provides an incentive to become more educated. This fact will also make a college educated
woman more attractive on the marriage market. The return from …nding a better partner on
the marriage market, in and of itself, may provide an extra return for females (and males)
to invest in college. Even if female labor is required at home, more women could still go
to college. Suppose that men desire women from the same socioeconomic group (and vice
versa), say for compatibility reasons. Then, the fact that there are more college educated
men around implies that there may be a bigger incentive for women to invest in college educations in order to become more desirable on the marriage market. A decline in the gender
gap (Point 6) will reinforce women’s incentives to acquire a college education. These forces
should cause people to become pickier about their mate, causing a decline in marriage and
a rise in divorce. Hence, one would expect a rise in assortative mating due to Point 5.

1.3

Relationship to the Literature

The framework developed here resembles, in some aspects, Greenwood and Guner (2009)
who study the fall in marriage and the rise in divorce. The focus of the current research
is on addressing: (1) the increase in assortative mating; (2) the di¤erences in the fall in
marriage and the rise in divorce that occurred across the college educated and non-college
educated populaces. Addressing these questions involves introducing heterogeneity in both
females and males, something absent in the Greenwood and Guner (2009) framework, where
individuals only di¤er by their marital status. Plus, a schooling decision needs to be introduced. This is important given the rise in college attainment for both females and males.
These factors complicate the analysis.
Another related paper is by Regalia and Ríos-Rull (2001), which was ahead of its time.
7

While in their marriage model there is heterogeneity in both females and males, the focus
is on accounting for the rise in the number of single mothers. They stress market forces,
such as a movement in the gender gap, as explaining this rise. A mechanism for studying
the rise in assortative mating appears to be absent. The framework is not set up to analyze
the trend in female labor supply; speci…cally, a woman splits her time between working and
investing in her child’s human capital formation. Jacquemet and Robin (2011) estimate a
search and matching model of the marriage market for the U.S. Their analysis focuses on
how female and male wages a¤ect marriage probabilities and the share of the marital surplus
received by partners. Given this goal, there is no need to include endogenous divorce or educational attainment in their model. The current research studies the role that technological
progress in the household sector, in conjunction with market forces, played in transforming
the American household. It tries to provide a uni…ed explanation for the above set of stylized
facts.
Parts of the picture have been addressed before elsewhere, in various ways. For example, Galor and Weil (1996) argue that technological progress in the market sector led to
a change in the nature of jobs (from brawn to brain so to speak) that was favorable to
women’s participation. Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) analyze the importance
of technological progress in the home sector for making it more feasible for married females
to enter into the labor market. Advances in maternal medicine and pediatric care played a
similar role, as has been noted by Albanesi and Olivetti (2010). Independent empirical work
by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) and Coen-Pirani, Leon, and Lugauer (2010) suggests that
labor-saving household products have increased married female labor supply. Adamopoulou
(2010) shows that they also have contributed to the rise of cohabitation. The importance
of the narrowing gender gap, also shown in Figure 4, is stressed by Jones, Manuelli and
McGrattan (2003). Eckstein and Lifshitz (forth.) study the e¤ect that di¤erent mechanisms
(schooling, the gender wage gap, fertility, and marriage and divorce) had on the rise in the
female labor-force participation during the twentieth century. They …nd that up to 42% of
the change is left unexplained. They attribute this residual component to improvements in
household technology and changes in social norms. [Changes in societal norms, a factor out
of the purview of the current analysis, have been addressed by Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti
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(2004)]. This is consistent with the story told in this paper.
Bethencourt and Ríos-Rull (2009) and Salcedo, Schoellman and Tertilt (2009) model the
rise in single families, but in contexts not involving marriage. On this, Choo and Siow (2006)
estimate, using a non-transferable utility model of the U.S. marriage market, that the gains
for marriage accruing to young adults fell sharply between 1971 and 1981. This suggests an
incentive for delaying marriage.
The fact that high skill premiums are associated with more positive assortative mating
has been noted by Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2005). Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss
(2009) discuss how positive assortative mating provides a marriage market return for female
educational investment, in addition to the traditional labor market one. Focusing on the fact
that more educated females are less likely to divorce than less educated ones in recent years,
Neeman, Newman and Olivetti (2008) argue that college educated working females might be
more selective in the marriage market and as a result their marriages might be more stable.
Households with a working wife might also be able to cope better with income shocks and
consequently might be less likely to experience a divorce. Restuccia and Vandenbroucke
(2009) provide a quantitative model of the recent rise in educational attainment.

1.4

A Snapshot of the Findings

The uni…ed framework developed here is matched with the U.S. data using a minimum distance estimation procedure. The procedure targets a collection of stylized facts concerning
educational attainment, marriage and divorce, and married female labor-force participation.
The framework …ts the data well. The structural parameter values obtained also look reasonable, and are tightly estimated. The shift in family structure can be decomposed into its
underlying driving forces. The …ndings suggest that technological progress in the household
sector accounts for the majority of the rise in married female-labor force participation. The
narrowing of the gender gap in wages plays a secondary role here, too. Technological progress
in the household sector also has a conspicuous e¤ect in explaining the fall in marriage and
the rise in divorce by education level. Changes in the structure of wages are important for
the rise in educational attainment and the increase in assortative mating.
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2

Model

To address the above issues three things are required. First, a model of marriage and divorce
is needed. Second, the framework must include a decision about whether or not married
females should work. Third, the structure should incorporate an education decision. This
motivates the following setup.

2.1

Setup

Imagine an economy that is populated by equal numbers of females, f , and males, m.
Some females and males are college educated, while others are non-college educated. Some
individuals of each gender will be married, the rest either divorced or never married. A
person faces a constant probability of dying, , each period. Upon death an individual is
replaced by a young doppelganger who is about to begin his or her adult life.
A person enters adult life with an ability level a 2 A. The initial ability is distributed
across the population in line with the distribution function A(a). It will be assumed that
a is log normally distributed so that ln a

N (0;

2
a ),

where

2
a

denotes the variance of this

zero-mean distribution. The …rst decision that a young adult makes is whether or not to
acquire an education. An uneducated male will earn the amount w0 a for each unit of labor
supplied on the market, while an educated one earns w1 a, where w1 > w0 . A female earns
the fraction

2 [0; 1] of what a comparable male does. This re‡ects the gender gap in labor

income. Acquiring an education has an up-front utility cost of C(a), where
C(a) = "=a! :
The idea here is that the cost of learning is inversely related to a person’s ability. Let
e 2 E =f0; 1g represent whether (e = 1) or not (e = 0) a person has acquired an education.
At the beginning of each period people must decide whether or not to work in market
during the period. Each person has one unit of time per period, which can be used for
market or home production. Let hf and hm denote the hours worked by a female and a male
in the market, respectively. The workweek in the market is …xed. This is re‡ected in the
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two possible values that h can take, h 2 H
time, allocating h to market and 1

f0; hg. Suppose single agents always work full

h to household work. It is assumed that in marriage h

is chosen only for the wife; the husband always works full-time.
Household goods are produced according to
n=

d + (1

)(z

hT )

1=

,0<

< 1,

(2)

where d is the amount of the household inputs, hT is the total amount of time spent on
market work, and z 2 f1; 2g is the household size. The restriction that 0 <
that inputs, d, and time, z

< 1 implies

hT , are substitutes in household production. Household inputs,

d, can be purchased at the price p in terms of the market good.
At the end of each period a single person will meet someone else of the opposite sex, with
ability level a . The couple will then draw two shocks. The …rst is a match-speci…c bliss
shock b 2 B, taken from the distribution F (b). In particular, b will be normally distributed so
that b

N (bs ;

2
b;s ),

where bs and

2
s

denote the mean and variance of this bliss distribution

that an unmarried couple draws from. The second shock, k 2 K = fkl ; kh g, measures the
cost for a married woman of going to work. Without loss of generality, assume that kl < kh .
Some families may place a greater value on the woman staying at home; perhaps they are
more likely to have children, a factor abstracted away from here. The k shock is drawn from
the distribution K(k), which is assumed to be uniform, i.e., there is an equal probability of
drawing either of these two values for the shock k. This shock is assumed to be permanent
and hence does not change over time.2 The couple then decides whether or not to marry.
This decision will be based upon both economic and noneconomic considerations, as will
soon become clear.
The noneconomic factors consist of the value of b, the value of k, and a measure of how
compatible a couple is. For a couple with education levels e and e ; this compatibility is
represented by the function M (e; e ), where
M (e; e ) =
2

0 (1

e)(1

e )+

1 (ee

):

Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2011) employ a similar strategy to model female labor force participa-

tion.
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If neither person went to college then this function returns a value of
while if both are college educated then it gives a value of

1.

0,

since e = e = 0,

It yields 0 for all other cases.

The economic factors are based upon each person’s ability and educational attainment; that
is, their (a; e) pair.
A married person must decide whether or not to remain with their current partner. In
a marriage the bliss shock evolves according to the distribution G(b0 jb). Speci…cally, the

bliss shock is assumed to follow the autoregressive process b0 = (1
b;m )bm + b;m b +
p
1
N (0; 1). Here bm and 2b;m represent the long-run mean and
b;m
b;m ", with "

variance of this process, while

is the coe¢ cient of autocorrelation.
Last, let all people discount the future at the rate = e(1
), where e is the subjective
b;m

discount factor. Suppose for singles that tastes over the consumption of market goods, c,
and nonmarket ones, n, are represented by
Ts (c; n) =

1
1

c)1

(c

+

1

n1 ;

where c is a …xed cost in terms of market goods. Assume that in marriage the utility derived
from consumption and love is a public good. Momentary utility for a married household is
Tm (c; n) =
where

1
1

c c
1+

1

+

1

n
1+

1

;

< 1 is the adult equivalence scale. The equivalence scale re‡ects the fact that are

economies of scale in household consumption, so that a two-person household requires less
than the twice the consumption of a one-person household in order to realize the same level
of utility as the latter.
To complete the description of the setting, the timing of events within a period is illustrated in Figure 5.

2.2

Singles

Consider the consumption decision facing a single. This is a purely static problem. For a
single person of gender g 2 ff; mg with ability a and educational attainment e 2 f0; 1g, the
12

Figure 5: Timing of Decisions

problem is given by
Usg (a; e)
subject to

and

(3)

max Ts (c; n);
c;n;d

8
< w ah pd; if g = f;
e
c=
: we ah pd; if g = m;
n=

d + (1

)(1

h)

1=

.

Next, turn to the marriage decision. Consider a single person of gender g 2 ff; mg with
ability a and educational attainment e. Suppose that this individual meets someone of the
opposite gender, g , who has ability a and education attainment e . Will they get married?
To answer this question, let Vsg (a; e) and Vsg (a ; e ) represent the expected lifetime utilities
that both parties will realize if they remain single in the current period. Likewise, denote
the expected lifetime utility that is associated with a marriage in the current period by

13

Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k). A marriage will occur if and only if
Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k)

Vsg (a; e) and Vmg (a ; e ; a; e; b; k)

Vsg (a ; e ):

(4)

Observe that for a marriage to happen it must be the …rst choice for both parties. Let the
indicator function 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) take a value of 1 if both people in the match want it
and value of zero otherwise. Thus,
8
< 1; if (4) holds,
1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) =
: 0; otherwise.

(5)

[Observe that 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) = 1g (a ; e ; a; e; b; k).]

The value of being single in the current period will depend on the distribution of potential
future mates on the marriage market. Each mate is indexed by their (a ; e ) combination.
But, note that e will be chosen at the beginning of adult life as a function of a . Thus,
one can write e = E g (a ), so that this distribution is actually just one dimensional. The
function E g will be discussed later. Thus, the distribution of potential mates from the
b g (a ). This too will be elaborated on later. The
opposite gender can be represented by S

value function for a single person of gender g with ability a and educational attainment e
can now be expressed as

Vsg (a; e) = Usg (a; e)
Z Z Z
+
f1g (a; e; a ; E g (a ); b; k)Vmg (a; e; a ; E g (a ); b; k)
+[1

(6)

K B A
g

b g (a )dF (b)dK(k), for g = f; m:
1 (a; e; a ; E g (a ); b; k)]Vsg (a; e)gdS

Embedded in the above dynamic programming problem is the assumption that one will draw
b g (a ).3
a mate next period with an ability level less than a with probability S
3

Other matching processes could be envisaged, such as the Gale and Shapley algorithm employed by Del
Boca and Flinn (2006).
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2.3

Couples

The static consumption problem for a married couple is
g
Um
(a; e; a ; e ; k)

subject to

max

c;n;d;hf 2f0;1g

8
< w a h + w ahhf
e
e
c=
: we ah + we a hhf

and

n=

d + (1

)(2

h

hf k;

Tm (c; n)

pd;

if g = f;

pd;

if g = m;

hhf )

1=

(7)

:

Recall that all utility ‡ows are public goods within a marriage. So, the couple picks c; n; d,
and hf together. Working in the market takes away the fraction h of a person’s time
endowment. Recall that husbands are assumed to work full-time. The variable hf 2 f0; 1g
represents the wife’s participation decision. It takes a value of 1 when the woman works and
a value of 0 if she doesn’t. Once again, the variable k gives the cost for a married woman of
going to work. This is netted out of household utility, when the woman works.
A divorce will occur if and only if
Vsg (a; e)

Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) or Vsg (a ; e )

Vmg (a ; e ; a; e; b; k):

(8)

Therefore, the indicator function 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k), speci…ed by (5), will return a value of
one if both the husband and wife want to remain married and will give a value of zero if one
of them desires a divorce. Given this, the value function for a married person reads
g
Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) = Um
(a; e; a ; e ; k) + b + M (e; e )
Z
+ f [1g (a; e; a ; e ; b0 ; k)Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b0 ; k)

+[1

(9)

B

1g (a; e; a ; e ; b0 ; k)]Vsg (a; e)]dG(b0 jb)g, for g = f; m:

This value function is used in equations (4), (5), (6) and (8); likewise, (6) is employed in (4),
(5), (8) and (9).
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2.4

Educational Choice

People choose their education level at the beginning of adult life. They do this based on
their ability, a, and gender, g. The problem they face is
max fVsg (a; e)

e2f0;1g

eC(a)g;

(10)

where Vsg is de…ned by (6). The decision rule stemming from this problem will be represented
by e = E g (a). Assume that this function is characterized by a simple threshold rule:
8
< 1 if a e
ag ;
g
E (a) =
: 0 if a < e
ag :

(11)

This assumption holds in the numerical analysis.

2.5

Steady-State Equilibrium

The dynamic programming problem for a single person, or (6), depends upon knowing the
solution to the problem for a married person, as given by (9), and vice versa. Furthermore, to
solve the single’s problem requires knowing the steady-state distribution of potential mates
in the marriage market, Sg (a). The non-normalized steady-state distribution for singles is
g

0

S (a ) = (1

)

Z Z Z
K

+(1

)

B

a0

A

Z

[1

A

Z Z Z Z
K

B

B

a0

A

+ A(a), for g = f; m:

Z

b g (a )dF (b)dK(k)
1g (a; E g (a); a ; E g (a ); b; k)]dSg (a)dS
[1

1g (a; E g (a); a ; E g (a ); b; k)]dMg (a; a ; b 1 ; k)dG(bjb 1 )

A

(12)

In the above recursion, Mg (a; a ; b; k) represents the steady-state distribution over married
b g (a ) denotes the normalized distribution for singles of the opposite gender
people and S
and is de…ned by

b g (a )
S

R
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Sg (a )
:
dSg (a )

(13)

The …rst term in (12) counts those singles who failed to match in the current period. The
second term enumerates the ‡ow into the pool of singles from failed marriages. The last
term represents the arrival of new adults (the doppelgangers).
In similar fashion, the distribution of married men and women is de…ned by
g

0

0

0

0

M (a ; a ; b ; k ) = (1
b ge
dS

+(1

)

Z

k0

K

Z

b0

B
g

Z

a0

A

Z

a

0

1g (a; E g (a); a ; E g (a ); b; k)

A

(a )dS (a)dF (b)dK(k)
Z k0 Z b0 Z Z a0 Z a 0
)
1g (a; E g (a); a ; E g (a ); b; k)
K

B

B

A

A

dMg (a; a ; b 1 ; k)dG(bjb 1 ), for g = f; m:

(14)

The …rst term on the righthand side measures the ‡ow into marriage from single life. Only
of these matches will last into the next period. The second term counts the number of

1

marriages that will survive from the current period into the next one. To compute a steadystate solution for the model amounts to solving a …xed-point problem, as the following
de…nition of equilibrium should make clear. [Note that Mg (a; a ; b; k) = Mg (a ; a; b; k).]
De…nition 1 A stationary matching equilibrium is a set of value functions for singles and
marrieds, Vsg (a; e) and Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k), an education decision rule for singles, egs = E g (a),
a matching rule for singles and married couples, 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k), and stationary distributions for singles and married couples, Sg (a) and Mg (a; a ; b 1 ; k), all for g = f; m, such
that:
1. The value function Vsg (a; e) solves the single’s recursion (6), taking as given her/his
indirect utility function, Usg (a; e), from problem (3), the value function for a married
person, Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k), the matching rule for singles, 1g (a; e; a ; E g (a ); b; k), and
b g (a), de…ned by (13).
the normalized distribution for singles, S

2. The value function Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) solves a married person’s recursion (9), tak-

g
ing as given her/his indirect utility function, Um
(a; e; a ; e ; k), from problem (7), the

matching rule for a married couple, 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b0 ; k), and the value function for a
single,Vsg (a; e).
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3. The decision rule egs = E g (a) solves a single’s education problem (10), taking as given
Vsg (a; e) from (6).
4. The matching rule 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k) is determined in line with (5), taking as given
the value functions Vsg (a; e) and Vmg (a; e; a ; e ; b; k).
5. The stationary distributions Sg (a) and Mg (a; a ; b 1 ; k) solve (12) and (14), taking as
given the decision rule for an education, eg = E g (a), and the matching rule 1g (a; e; a ; e ; b; k).

3

Estimation

The model developed will now be …t to the U.S. data. There are many parameters. A few
of them are easy to choose and can be assigned on the basis of a priori information. Most
of the parameters will be …tted using a minimum distance estimation procedure, however.
The estimation procedure will focus on two years in the U.S. data, viz 1960 and 2005. It
will be assumed that the model is in a steady state for each of these years.

3.1

A Priori Information

The easy ones will be done …rst. The length of period is one year. Let e (the subjective
discount factor) be 0.96. If one assumes an operational lifespan of 30 years then the survival
probability is 1
0:960

= 0:97. This would dictate a value for the discount factor of

=

0:97. Assigning a value for the work week, h, is straightforward. Assume a 40

hour work week. Since there are 112 non-sleeping hours in a week, let h = 40=112 = 0:36.
Last, the household production parameters,

and , have been estimated by McGrattan,

Rogerson and Wright (1997). Their numbers are used here.
How should wages be inputted into the model? Take males …rst. Wages are needed
for non-college and college educated males for 1960 and 2005; viz, w0;1960 , w1;1960 , w0;2005
and w1;2005 . Normalize the wage rate for a non-college educated male in 1960 to be one,
so that w0;1960 = 1. Turn to the wage rate rate for a college educated male in 1960. The
college premium was 1.34 in 1960. This is the average ratio of wages for a college educated
male to a non-college educated one. Recall that e
am is the threshold level of ability that
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determines whether the male goes to college or not–see (11). The college premium for the
m
model will read (w1;1960 am
1;1960 )=(w0;1960 a0;1960 ), where the average abilities for non-college
R eam
1960
adA(a)=A(e
am
educated and college educated males are de…ned by am
1960 ) and
0;1960
R
am
adA(a)=[1 A(e
am
1;1960
1960 )], respectively. This is an endogenous variable, because
e
am
1960

young single males decide whether or not to go to school. Set e
am
1960 , given the assumed

ability distribution, so that the number of college educated males, 1

A(e
am
1960 ), will match

m
the data for the year 1960. This ties down am
0;1960 and a1;1960 . Then, let w1;1960 be speci…ed

by the relationship w1;1960 = 1:34

m
w0;1960 (am
0;1960 =a1;1960 ). Of course, this procedure is

predicated on the assumption that the estimation routine (discussed in the next subsection)
can successfully replicate the fraction of males that went to college in 1960.
Move onto 2005. A non-college educated male earned 1.14 times as much as in 1960.
Suppose that the estimation procedure yields the correct number of college educated males
m
for 2005. This pins down am
0;2005 and a1;2005 , by the above argument. Set w0;2005 = 1:14
m
w0;1960 (am
0;1960 =a0;2005 ). Last, the college premium in 2005 was 1.76. This dictates that

w1;2005 = 1:76

m
w0;2005 (am
0;2005 =a1;2005 ). Observe that if the estimation procedure matches the

U.S. educational decisions for males for the years 1960 and 2005 then it will replicate the
observed wage structure by construction.
What about females? Values for the two gender gap parameters,

1960

and

2005 ,

need

to be assigned. This is done by estimating a wage regression using the Heckman correction
procedure. Speci…cally, the following regression is run:
ln w = constant +

education +

age +

age2 + e

gender + ".

Here education is a dummy variable returning a value of one if the person is college
educated and zero otherwise. Likewise, gender is another dummy variable assigning a value
of one when the respondent is female. A selection equation for labor-force participation is also
estimated as part of the statistical model. It also includes dummy variables for the marital
status of the person and whether or not s/he has children. After estimating this statistical
model, the gender gaps for 1960 and 2005 can be recovered: 1960 = exp(e1960 ) = 0:59 and
= exp(e ) = 0:83. To summarize, the parameter values picked on the basis of a
2005

2005
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priori information are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters –A Priori information
Category
Parameter Values
Criteria
Preferences
= 0:96 (1
); = 0:70
A priori information
Household Technology
= 0:21; = 0:19
McGrattan et al (1997)
Life span
1= = 30
A priori information
Wages
w0;1960 = 1; w1;1960 = 1:068
Data
w0;2005 = 1:180; w1;2005 = 1:702
Data
=
0:59;
=
0:83
(gender
gap)
Data
1960
2005
Hours
h = 0:36
Data

3.2

Minimum Distance Estimation

The rest of the parameters are chosen so that the model matches, as closely as is possible, a
set of data moments for the years 1960 and 2005. Let data represent a vector of moments
that are calculated from the U.S. data for the two years 1960 and 2005. In particular, it
contains the following statistics for each of the two years:
1. Educational Attainment. The fraction of females and males that went to college.
2. Vital Statistics. The fraction of the population that has ever-been married by educational level, and that is currently divorced (out of the ever-married populace) by
education level.
3. Assortative Mating. A contingency for marriage that contains the fractions of marriages for each possible combination of educational levels for both the husband and
wife.
4. Married Female Labor-Force Participation. The fraction of married females that work
by education level and the share of household income provided by wives.
A vector of the analogous 24 moments can be obtained from steady states of the model for
the two years 1960 and 2005. The results for the model will be a function of the parameters
to be estimated, of course. Therefore, represent this vector of moments by M(!) where !
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denotes the vector of 18 parameters to be estimated. De…ne the vector of deviations between
the data and the model by G(!)

data M(!).

Minimum distance estimation picks the parameter vector, !, to minimize a weighted
sum of the squared deviations between the data and the model. Speci…cally,
!
b = arg min G(!)0 W G(!);

where W is some positive semi-de…nite matrix. The estimation assumes that the model is
a true description of the world, for some value of the parameter vector, !. The number of
targets is larger than the number of parameters. The estimator, !
b , is consistent for any
weighting matrix, W . Let se(b
! ) represent the vector of standard errors for the estimator, !
b.
It is given by

se(b
! ) = diagf
where J(b
!)

@M(b
! )=@b
!,

[J(b
! )0 W J(b
! )] 1 J(b
! )0 W W J(b
! )[J(b
! )0 W J(b
! )]
n

10

g;

is the variance-covariance matrix for the data moments, and

n is the total number of observations. The data moments are calculated from two di¤erent
sources in IPUMS-USA: viz, the census for 1960 and the American Community Survey
for 2005. The moments are independent across these two samples. Therefore,

is block

diagonal, with a block corresponding to a di¤erent sample size. Each block is weighted
by the number of observations in the block relative to the total number of observations.
(Additionally, within a block the number of observations may vary across moments. Hence,
observations within a block may be weighted di¤erently.) Set W = I, where I is the identity
matrix.
Table 3 reports the parameter estimates and their associated standard errors. The …tted
parameter values look reasonable and are tightly estimated, for the most part. The price
of home inputs is estimated to decline at 7:4 percent annually. The 95 percent con…dence
interval for this estimate is [6:4; 8:4]. This in accord with the quality-adjusted price declines
reported by Gordon (1990) for consumer durables. The estimate of the degree of curvature in
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the utility function for market goods ( = 1:82) is in line with the macroeconomics literature,
which typically uses a coe¢ cient of relative aversion of either 1 or 2. Note that nonmarket
goods have a weight of

= 1:18 in utility. This can be thought of as corresponding to a

weight assigned to consumption in a typical macro model of 0:43, with the remaining weight
of 0:57 being assigned to leisure; i.e., 0:57=0:43 = 1:18. Nonmarket goods play a role similar
to leisure here. Thus, this coe¢ cient does not seem unreasonable. The utility function for
nonmarket goods is slightly more concave ( = 2:99). As was mentioned in the introduction,
this implies that a household will tilt its allocation towards market goods as it gets wealthier.
Therefore, single households gain the most from labor-saving household inputs, because a
larger fraction of their consumption is devoted to nonmarket goods. Thus, an innovation
in the home sector will favor the establishment of single households. A household spends
about 13.7 percent of its market consumption on covering the …xed costs of a home (when
c = 0:047) in 1960. This number declines to 8.5 percent in 2005. Last, an educated person
realizes 0.83 utils ( 1 ) from marrying a similarly educated person. This compares to the
mean level of bliss in a marriage of 0.92 in 1960 and 1.23 in 2005.
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Table 3: Parameters –Estimated (Minimum Distance)
Category
Parameter Values
Standard Error
95% Conf Int
Preferences
= 1:18
0:0030
[1:170; 1:182]
= 2:99
0:0094
[2:968; 3:005]
= 1:82
0:0079
[1:806; 1:836]
c= 0:047
0:0007
[0:046; 0:049]
0:0041
[0:057; 0:073]
0 = 0:07
=
0:83
0:0813
[0:674; 0:993]
1
Ability Shocks
0:0017
[0:012; 0:018]
a = 0:015
bs = 1:21
0:0794
[ 1:367; 1:056]
Matching Shocks
=
2:90
0:0629
[2:778; 3:025]
b;s
bm = 0:36
0:0105
[0:336; 0:377]
0:0089
[0:260; 0:295]
b;m = 0:28
=
0:93
0:0043
[0:924; 0:941]
b;m
Home Shocks
kl = 0:49
0:0405
[0:411; 0:569]
kh = 2:01
0:1799
[1:656; 2:361]
Prices
p1960 = 20:24
0:8711
[18:537; 21:951]
(2005 1960)
p2005 = p1960 e
= 0:074
0:0051
[0:064; 0:084]
Cost of Education " = 45:77
2:6196
[40:638; 50:907]
! = 14:91
0:8697
[13:202; 16:611]

4

Findings

The goal of the analysis is to see whether the above framework can explain: (i) the rise
in assortative mating; (ii) the decline in marriage and the increase in divorce, which has
impacted on non-college educated individuals more than college educated ones. Ideally, this
should be done while simultaneously explaining the increase in college education and the rise
in married female labor-force participation. The questions of interest are (i) how well can
the two simulated steady states for the model match the set of stylized facts computed for
these two years and (ii) what are the main forces driving the observed changes in household
structure.
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4.1

U.S. Stylized Facts and Benchmark Model Results

The set of stylized facts regarding American households and the corresponding results for
the benchmark model are displayed in Table 4. All data variables are targets (but note
that the fraction of people who are single or married, the correlation between a husband’s
and wife’s education level, and total married female labor-force participation derive from
the other statistics.) Overall the model does a good job matching the set of stylized facts
presented for the years 1960 and 2005. First, it predicts a rise in education over this time
period for both males and females. In 1960 more males (11.6 percent) went to college than
females (6.7 percent) in the U.S. This situation had reversed by 2005 (28.4 percent versus
30.1). While the the framework does not yield this reversal, females catch up with males.
(For males it increases from 9.8 to 30.8 percent and for females from 8.6 to 30.8 percent).
Second, marriage became less important over this period. Speci…cally, the fraction of the
population that is single more than doubled in the data (from 12.6 to 34.8 percent). The
model generates a similar increase (16.8 to 34.2 percent). The rise in the number of singles
and the fall in the fraction of marrieds is due to both a decline in the rate of marriage and an
increase in the rate of divorce. This feature of the data is also matched. The model has some
di¢ culty mimicking the very high rate of marriage for the non-college educated in 1960. The
model does deliver a more pronounced decrease in the marriage rates between 1960 and 2005
for non-college educated people compared to the college-educated, however; marriage rates
for less educated people decline by 10 percentage points in the model (compared to 13 in
the data) whereas the decline for college-educated people is 8.7 percentage points (and 7 in
the data). In the data the increase in divorce is greater for non-college educated people (3.4
percent to 17.2) vis-à-vis educated ones (2.4 percent to 10.6). The model has no trouble
generating the di¤erential increase in divorce. The fraction of divorced people increases by
12 percentage points for non-college educated people (versus 13.8 in the data) and only by
8.5 for college educated ones (compared with the 8.2 that was observed). The model yields
a slightly higher level of divorce in 1960; 3.8 percent in the model versus 2.4 percent in the
data for college educated people and 4.6 percent in the model versus 3.4 percent in the data
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for non-college educated ones. As a result, the proportion of singles in the model is also
higher than the data in 1960.
Third, the framework has no trouble generating a rise in assortative mating. In fact,
the mechanism in the model is too strong. The correlation between a husband’s and wife’s
education level for 1960 is lower in the model (0.41 in the data compared with 0.103 in
the model) but is very close for 2005 (0.519 in data as compared with the model’s 0.521).
Additionally, for both years, the contingency tables generated by the model are also very
close to their data counterparts.4
Finally, the model does a great job replicating the increase in labor-force participation by
married females (from 31.5 to 71.0 percent in the data and 23.7 to 74 percent in the model).
The model is also consistent with the relative labor-force participation by education levels:
for females with less than college, this statistic increases from 30.9 to 68.4 percent in the
data versus 21.7 to 72.6 percent in the model. For college educated females, it rises from
41.4 to 76.3 percent in the data and from 44.7 to 77.3 percent in the model. The model
also explains well the upward movement in the share of family income that working wives
provide (15.7 to 33.7 percent in the data versus 10 to 34.7 percent for the model).5

4

The model has di¢ culty generating the rise in marriages between skilled females and unskilled males.
Coles and Francesconi (2011) study the emergence of these “toyboy” marriages within a model where individuals value both the wage as well as …tness of their partners.
5
The model generates a gender gap that is reasonably close to the observed gender gap in the data for
1960 and 2005. This suggests that if the ’s for 1960 and 2005 are estimated to match the observed raw
gender gaps, instead of being estimated directly from the data using a wage regression with an Heckman
correction, the benchmark economy would not look very di¤erent.
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Education

Marriage
Fraction

Table 4: Data and Benchmark Model
1960
2005
Data
Model
Data
Model
Males Fem
Males Fem
Males
Fem
Males Fem
0.067
0.116 0.086
0.098 0.301
0.284 0.308
0.308

Sing
0.126

Marr
0.874

Sing
0.168

Marr
0.832

Sing
0.348

Marr
0.652

Sing
0.342

Marr
0.658

Rates
–Marriage
–Divorce

< Coll Coll
0.917
0.856
0.034
0.024

< Coll Coll
0.871
0.876
0.046
0.038

< Coll Coll
0.787
0.786
0.172
0.106

< Coll Coll
0.771
0.789
0.166
0.123

Sorting
Husband
< Coll
Coll
Corr, educ

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.856
0.024
0.080
0.040
0.410

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.827
0.072
0.083
0.018
0.103

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.564
0.109
0.104
0.223
0.519

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.571
0.089
0.121
0.218
0.521

0.315
0.309
0.414
0.157

0.237
0.217
0.447
0.100

0.710
0.684
0.763
0.337

0.740
0.726
0.773
0.347

Work, Marr Fem
Participation, All
Participation, < Coll
Participation, Coll
Income, frac

4.2

Under the Hood

The forces underlying the rise in education, the decline in marriage, the increase in assortative
mating, and the upswing in married female labor-force participation will now be inspected.
These forces are labor-saving technological progress in the home, a rise in the general level
of wages, a widening in the college premium, and a narrowing of the gender gap. Three
experiments are considered here. First, technological advance in the household sector will
be shut down. Hence, there are only changes in the wage structure in this experiment.
Second, shifts in the wage structure are turned o¤. Now there is only technological progress
in the home. Third, the gender gap is prevented from narrowing.
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4.2.1

No Technological Progress in the Home (Change in Wage Structure Only)

To begin with, consider shutting down technological progress in the home. Thus, only
changes in the wage structure are operational. Speci…cally, …x the 2005 price of household
inputs, p, at the 1960 level. Think about this experiment as representing a comparative
statics exercise, one done numerically as opposed to the more traditional qualitative analysis
that uses pencil and paper techniques. The results of this experiment are shown in Table
5. As can be seen from the table, technological progress in the household sector is vital for
promoting married female labor-force participation. Without it very few married women
would work. In fact, a lower fraction of educated females would work in 2005 than in 1960.
This is because households are richer in 2005 than in 1960, due to a rise in wages. The
associated income e¤ect leads to more women staying at home. This is especially true for
the women who are married to educated (and therefore richer) men. These women also tend
to be educated as well.
Producing home goods is labor intensive. Married households are better disposed to undertake household production relative to single ones, because they have a larger endowment
of time. As can be seen, marriage is higher and divorce is lower in 2005 when there is no
technological progress in the home. This establishes the fact that technological progress
in the home is important for marriage and divorce. In particular, without technological
progress in the home, the model is not able to deliver the observed rise in the divorce rates
and decline in marriage rates, and misses the large di¤erential trends in divorce by education
that are observed in the data. In this situation, people are less well disposed to maintain
single households, because the cost of household inputs is high. This is especially true for
the non-college educated who are poorer.
There is still a rise in educational attainment. Surprisingly, slightly more males and
females go to school in 2005 than in the benchmark model. This is because households are
poorer than in the benchmark model. Individuals can go to college to make up for this, in
part. They can’t increase their labor supply, given the assumption of a …xed workweek. The
number of females going to college increases more, even though very few of them will work
when married. This is interesting. Women value a college education because it increases the
income they earn when single. Young women are single for a time before they get married.
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Having a college degree allows them to live better. Because of this they can be pickier about
the husband they will marry. Having a college degree will also mitigate the impact of a
divorce. There is still a large increase in assortative mating. Having a college degree is also
bene…cial for a female because it is intrinsically attractive for a college educated male.
Table 5: No Technological Progress in the Home
(Change in Wage Structure Only)
1960
2005
Benchmark
Experiment
Benchmark
Education
Fem
Males Fem
Males Fem
Males
0.086
0.098 0.333
0.360 0.308
0.308
Marriage
Fraction

Sing
0.168

Marr
0.832

Sing
0.211

Marr
0.789

Sing
0.342

Marr
0.658

Rates
–Marriage
–Divorce

< Coll Coll
0.871
0.876
0.046
0.038

< Coll Coll
0.838
0.846
0.071
0.043

< Coll Coll
0.771
0.789
0.166
0.123

Sorting
Husband
< Coll
Coll
Corr, educ

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.827
0.072
0.083
0.018
0.103

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.557
0.062
0.110
0.270
0.628

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.571
0.089
0.121
0.218
0.521

0.237
0.217
0.447
0.100

0.363
0.450
0.186
0.177

0.740
0.726
0.773
0.347

Work, Marr Fem
Participation, All
Participation, < Coll
Participation, Coll
Income, fraction

The absence of technological progress in the home leads to a large drop in female labor
supply. One might think that the equilibrium level of wages will rise in response. This
could operate to dampen the withdrawal of labor e¤ort by women. The structure employed
here assumes that production is linear in male and female work e¤ort, so such an e¤ect is
precluded. Consider relaxing this, somewhat.
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In particular, imagine an aggregate production function of the form
o = zk h1

;

where o is aggregate output, z is total factor productivity, k is the capital stock, h is the
total stock of labor measured in e¢ ciency units, and z is total factor productivity. Let k = 1
and set

= 1=3. The problem with using this production function is the introduction of

capital. In particular, are people able to buy or trade capital? To keep things simple, this
needs to be ruled out. Suppose that there is a government in the economy. It owns this
capital stock. It rents it out at the rental rate r. The proceeds from this rental income are
used to …nance government spending, g. This government spending could be entered into
the utility function in a separable way. This assumption implies that there is no need to
think about capital income. Workers will only earn their wages, as before. The wage rate
for a unit of raw unskilled labor, w0 , is given by
w0 = (1

)zh

.

Note that h is simply the sum of labor e¤ort across all individuals, where each type of labor
is weighted by their 2005 e¢ ciency level in production; i.e., a college educated woman of
ability level a is weighted by

2005 (w1;2005 =w0;2005 )a.

Total factor productivity, z, is picked

so that the model matches the unskilled wage rate for 2005. This implies that z = 1:58.
The results are shown in Table 6 below. Somewhat surprisingly, married female laborforce participation drops even further. Why? It is true that the general level of wages does
rise when married female labor-force participation drops. But, when there is no technological
progress in the household sector, female labor is greatly valued at home. The rise in the
general level of wages makes households better o¤, ceteris paribus, because males now earn
more. The positive income e¤ect associated with the increase in husbands’incomes induces
more wives to stay at home.
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Table 6: Married Female Labor-Force Participation
Experiment/G.E. E¤ects
Participation 0.336
4.2.2

Experiment/No G.E. E¤ects

Benchmark

0.363

0.740

No Change in Wage Structure (Technological Progress in the Home Only)

Compare this to the situation where there is no change in wages. In particular, set wages for
both females and males at the levels they had in 1960; i.e., w0;2005 = w0;1960 , w1;2005 = w1;1960 ,
and

2005

=

1960 .

The results of this comparative statics experiment are shown in Table 7.

Observe that the number of married women that work in 2005 is actually higher than in the
benchmark model. Therefore, increases in wages are not the important drivers of the rise in
married female labor-force participation. Technological progress in the household sector is.
More women work relative to the benchmark, because households are less wealthy due to the
fact that wages are …xed. This also raises the rate of marriage and lowers the rate of divorce
vis-à-vis the benchmark. There are also more marriages. Still, wages play an important role
in the analysis. The table illustrates that the increase in educational attainment for both
women and men is in‡uenced by the rise in the college premium. Without this, educational
attainment for females and males change very little. Finally, the degree of assortative mating
remains more or less constant when the wage structure is held …xed (as opposed to the strong
increase in the benchmark model). Therefore, changes in wages drive the rise in assortative
mating.
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Table 7: No Change in Wage Structure
(Technological Progress in the Home Only)
1960
2005
Benchmark
Experiment
Benchmark
Education
Fem
Males Fem
Males Fem
Males
0.086
0.098 0.111
0.086 0.308
0.308
Marriage
Fraction

Marr
0.832

Sing
0.339

Marr
0.661

Sing
0.342

Marr
0.658

Rates
–Marriage
–Divorce

< Coll Coll
0.871
0.876
0.046
0.038

< Coll Coll
0.771
0.804
0.152
0.103

< Coll Coll
0.771
0.789
0.166
0.123

Sorting
Husband
< Coll
Coll
Corr, educ

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.827
0.072
0.083
0.018
0.103

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.809
0.105
0.062
0.024
0.139

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.571
0.089
0.121
0.218
0.521

0.237
0.217
0.447
0.100

0.799
0.791
0.851
0.306

0.740
0.726
0.773
0.347

Work, Marr Fem
Participation, All
Participation, < Coll
Participation, Coll
Income, fraction
4.2.3

Sing
0.168

No Change in the Gender Gap,

For the last experiment, just shut down the rise in the gender gap; i.e., set

2005

=

1960 .

This experiment does not shift the benchmark equilibrium as much as the other two do. It
will only be brie‡y discussed. The full set of results is presented in Table 8 in the Appendix.
First, there is little change in the education rates for females. This is not surprising because
a change in the gender gap does not the in‡uence the return from going to college relative
to not going. Second, the rate of marriage remains constant for college-educated people
and decreases a bit for the less educated. Third, assortative mating declines somewhat. The
correlation between educational types drops from 0.52 in the benchmark equilibrium to 0.47.
Perhaps a single female can no longer choose to be as picky about her mate. Fourth, there is
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a drop in married women’s labor-force participation from 74% to 64%. So, the majority of
the 50 percentage point rise in married female labor-force participation (in the model) can
be attributed to technological progress in the home; recall that when technological advance
in the home is shut down that married female labor force participation drops from 74% to
36%.
Taking stock of the results from the above three comparative statics exercises suggests
that technological progress in the household sector plays an important role in stimulating
labor-force participation by married females. The narrowing of the gender plays a signi…cant,
but secondary role, here. Technological progress in the household sector also contributes
greatly to the decline in marriage and the rise in divorce. The widening in the college
premium is instrumental in motivating females and males to go to college. Together with
the rise in the gender gap this leads to an increase in assortative mating.

5

Conclusions

People today are more likely to marry someone of the same socioeconomic class than in the
past. At the same time the prevalence of marriage has fallen and the occurrence of divorce
has risen, especially for people without a college education. Women are much more likely to
go to college now. Married ones work more. This has led to a dramatic transformation of
the American household.
To address these facts a model of marriage and divorce is developed. In the constructed
framework, individuals marry for both economic and noneconomic reasons. The noneconomic
reasons are companionship and love. The economic ones are the values of a spouses’s labor
at home and in the market. Technological progress in the household sector erodes the value
of labor at home. This reduces the importance for a marriage of the labor used in household
production. As a result married women enter the labor market. Love becomes a more
important determinant in marriage. An individual can now a¤ord to delay marriage and
wait to …nd a mate that makes him or her happy. This leads to a decline in marriage and
a rise in divorce. Increases in the college premium provide an incentive for both young men
and women to go to college. A college educated person earns more in both married and
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single life. The fact that men now desire women that make a good income provides a extra
incentive for a young woman to go to college, or vice versa. An additional motivation may
be that people like to marry others with the same educational background.
The structural model developed is …tted to the U.S. data using a minimum distance estimation procedure. A collection of data moments summarizing educational attainment, the
patterns of marriage and divorce, and married female labor-force participation is targeted.
The estimated structural model matches the stylized facts describing the transformation of
U.S. households well, yielding parameter values that are both reasonable and tightly estimated. Like almost everything in life there is still room for improvement. In particular,
the model struggles somewhat to mimick the very high level of marriage that is observed in
1960 for the non-college educated segment of the population. Also, the degree of assortative
mating predicted by the model for the early period is too weak. Technological progress at
home is found to be an important factor for explaining the rise in married female labor-force
participation. The narrowing of the gender gap plays an ancillary role here. Technological
progress in home is also a signi…cant driver of the decline in marriage and rise in divorce by
education level. The structure of wages in the U.S. has a powerful in‡uence on assortative
mating and educational attainment.

6

Appendix

Unless stated otherwise, all data is obtained from IPUMS-USA. For the years 1960, 1970,
1980, 1990 and 2000 the data derives from federal censuses, while for 2005 it comes from
the American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS has a sample size comparable to the one
percent census samples that IPUMS provides for the other years. The age group for which
the analysis is done is 25-54. A college educated individual refers to someone with 4 years of
college or more, otherwise the person is labelled as being non-college educated. This applies
to both males and females.
Figure 1. The fraction of the population that is ever married is one minus the fraction
of the population that is never married. The fraction of the population that is currently
divorced is calculated by taking the stock of currently divorced and then dividing it by the
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stock of ever-married people.
Figure 2. The value of

t

is plotted from the regression equation (1). This equation is

estimated for married couples using the data mentioned above. The regression coe¢ cient
measures the incremental likelihood (relative to 1960) that an educated male is married to
an educated female in the year t, for t = 1970, 1980; 1990; 2000, and 2005.
Figure 3. Female labor-force participation is calculated from the variable EMPSTAT
in IPUMS. This variable reports whether or not an individual is in the labor force. This
calculation is done for both college and non-college educated women. A wife’s contribution
to family income is calculated by computing the ratio of her labor income to total family
labor income. This ratio is averaged across all married women.
Figure 4. A woman is labelled as having a college degree if she has 4 years of college or
more. The college premium is calculated by dividing the average labor income for college
educated men by the average labor income for non-college educated ones. For the gender
gap, the average wage for employed women is calculated. The sample is trimmed to exclude
women who report incomes that are above the 99th percentile and below the 1st. The same
is done for men. The gender gap is the ratio of the two averages.
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Education

Table 8: No Change in Gender Gap,
1960
2005
Benchmark
Experiment
Benchmark
Fem
Males Fem
Males Fem
Males
0.086
0.098 0.360
0.308 0.308
0.308

Marriage
Fraction

Sing
0.168

Marr
0.832

Sing
0.377

Marr
0.623

Sing
0.342

Marr
0.658

Rates
–Marriage
–Divorce

< Coll Coll
0.871
0.876
0.046
0.038

< Coll Coll
0.738
0.782
0.201
0.117

< Coll Coll
0.771
0.789
0.166
0.123

Sorting
Husband
< Coll
Coll
Corr, educ

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.827
0.072
0.083
0.018
0.103

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.507
0.156
0.091
0.246
0.476

Wife
< Coll Coll
0.571
0.089
0.121
0.218
0.521

0.237
0.217
0.447
0.100

0.645
0.653
0.633
0.261

0.740
0.726
0.773
0.347

Work, Marr Fem
Participation, All
Participation, < Coll
Participation, Coll
Income, fraction
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